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A Theory of Justice by John Rawls was translated into Polish at the beginning of 
1994. This publication aroused wide interest in Rawls and his ideas in our country. 
Despite the fact that the original English version was published in 1971, it is not easy 
to find an exhaustive analysis of the Rawlsian version of Anglo-Saxon liberalism in 
Polish. At the moment of the dissemination of the Polish edition of A Theory... this 
need became even more noticeable. ’ Some attempt to bring closer the knowledge 
of Rawls and his output were taken up, among others, by Ryszard Legutko and Wo­
jciech Sadurski. 12 3*However, analyses by these authors should be treated rather as an 
encouragement for other research than an attempt to close the discussion. Since 
1994 one can notice widespread interest in A Theory... accompanied by an increase 
in the number of followers and opponents of its author. Meanwhile, Rawls has 
changed his viewpoint significantly. The process of his standpoint verification can be 
observed when one scrutinizes the content of Rawls's articles published between 
1975-1993- The process stopped in 1993 with the publication of Political Liberalism. 
Five years later a Polish reader received a translated edition of Political... 5 In such a 
short period of time both main works of Rawls became available in Polish. Although 
a wide discussion of A Theory... has not been completed, we already have to chal­
lenge Political... 5 The Anglo-Saxon world had 22 years at its disposal. We, much 
less. Therefore it is obvious that comparison of previous and current versions of 
Ralws’s perception of justice in the field of Polish political science is desirable. This 
is the main aim of the author of the article. It is not going to be an exhaustive pres­
entation of the Rawlsian conception of justice as such, but an attempt to indicate the 
scope of changes between A Theory... and Political... 
1 Rawls J., Teoria sprawiedliwości, translated by Maciej Panufnik, Jarosław Pasek, and 
Adam Romaniuk, Warszawa: PWN 1994. 
2Legutko R., Dylematy kapitalizmu, Paris: Editions Spotkania 1986. 
Sadurski W., Neoliberalny system wartości politycznych, Warszawa: PWN, 1980; Teoria 
sprawiedliwości. Podstauowe zagadnienia, Warszawa: PWN 1988. 
3 Rawls J., Liberalizm polityczny, translated by Adam Romaniuk, Warszawa: PWN 1998. 
1 Rawls maintains that Political... is not a new, corrected version of his vision of justice but
only an attempt to clarify his origin. '1 viewpoint and to explain some misunderstandings raised 
after publishing A Theory... But the scope of changes and their importance lets us contend 
that he actually has changed his original standpoint significantly. 
Almost immediately after publication, A Theory... has gained the status of a classi­
cal work. In the field of Anglo-Saxon political theory and ethics there is no out­
standing work that does not somehow try to confront A Theory.... Therefore it is 
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impossible to overestimate Rawls’s contribution in the development of contemporary 
political philosophy. Many well-known works of other outstanding authors were 
based on criticism or at least a reflection of A Theory... Here one ought to mention 
Anarchy, State and Utopia by Robert Nozick (1974) and Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justiceby Michael Sandel (1982). We should pay special attention to Sandel’s accom­
plishment. Publication of Liberalism... can be perceived as the birth of a new stream 
of Anglo-Saxon political thought called communitarianism. Its leading theorists are 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, and Amitai Etzioni, who came to 
Sandel’s aid in critical formulation. All of them have challenged Rawls’s thought. 
Communitarianism has attained a very significant position in the USA and Canada, 
gaining also many followers in Great Britain and Australia. Its criticism of liberalism, 
represented among others by Rawls’s theory, increased the ideological deliberation 
between these streams of political thought in the last decade. We can presume that the 
communitarian critique influenced the direction of Rawls’s changes of his viewpoint. 
However, opponents of this contention maintain that Rawls started modification of his 
vision of justice in 1975, when his article Fairness to Goodness was published. Re­
gardless, communitarians participated in presenting some charges to which Rawls has 
had to respond. It seems that Political... is an aftermath of that reaction. To conceive 
of reasons for modifications of A Theory... is impossible without apprehension of the 
communitarian critique of contemporary individualistic liberalism. To satisfy that de­
mand, an attempt to explain the clue of this confrontation will be taken into consid­
eration in this article, though in a concise form. More attention will be paid to the 
Sandelian critique of A Theory..., because of his evident interest in criticizing Rawls’s 
thought and because of the fact that he is one of precursors of communitarianism. 
The author presumes that the reader is already familiar with the basis of Rawls’s 
political philosophy. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF RAWLS'S VISION OF JUSTICE
The starting point of A Theory... is the presentation of a concept of “the original 
position”. The reason for introducing this concept is to explain how “the two princi­
ples of justice” are recognized and defined. This is the guiding idea of the Rawlsian 
theory of justice that arouses most of controversies. It is also the point that became 
the main target of Sandel’s attack and has been modified to the largest extent. The 
changes in the idea of the original position determined modifications in other ele­
ments of the Rawlsian vision of justice. Therefore, this analysis starts with the pres­
entation of changes in the idea of the original position. 
1.  The Original Position
1. 1.  One of the main mechanisms Rawls used to construct his vision of justice 
was to carry to a higher level of abstraction the theory of social contract. Contrary to 
classics of liberal thought, he does not intend to show us the genesis of society’s 
foundation. He tries to focus our attention on the clue of social contract which is 
expected to establish some principles of: a) basic rights and duties; and b) the divi­
sion of social benefits. These principles must be accepted by everybody and serve as 
a regulator of social behavior and the conduct of social institutions. 5
5 By institutions Rawls means a public system of rules which defines offices and positions
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Having respect for the liberal tradition, Rawls assumes that individuals have dif­
ferent needs, life plans, expectations and patterns of behavior the rights of which 
should be guaranteed, as long as they do not violate the same rights of others. 
A consequence of this presumption the adoption of a hypothesis that people also 
have different visions of freedom. But, as Rawls maintains, they do not. He proves 
that rational people single out one conception of justice: justice as fairness. *6
with their rights and duties, powers and immunities. In other words, the political constitution 
and the principal economic and social arrangements. 
6 Rawls J., A Theory..., p. 5. 
7 Ibid., p. 7.
8 Ibid., p. 152-153.
9 Ibid., p. 136—142.
10 Ibid., p. 136.
11 Ibid., p. 453.
Fairness has two meanings in this context. 
First, fairness must be an intrinsic feature of justice. Public institutions in the liberal 
state are fair if they impose the same rights and duties on everybody irrespectively, 
and if they fairly determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. 7
Second, fairness is understood as the objective conduct of participants of the so­
cial contract, based on a vision of justice approved unanimously. The fact that the 
parties of the contract are going to choose this particular vision of justice (justice as 
fairness) is derived from the special situation of the original position. Individuals in 
the original position reject flawed conceptions of justice, by employing the 
“maximum rule”. This rule says that persons in the original position adopt a vision of 
justice which the worst outcome is superior to the worst outcomes of others. 8 To use 
the “maximum rule" requires rationality. This rationality is limited by lack of neces­
sary information available for those people to make the best choices. Rawls intro­
duces the term “the veil of ignorance. ’’9 The veil of ignorance makes our perception 
in the original position very limited. This limitation is common and means that all 
people occupy the same starting point in the original position. The veil of ignorance 
makes all of us ignorant about our place in society, our class position or social 
status. We have no knowledge about natural features (intelligence, strength and 
other physical and mental properties) and our conception of a good, rational, and 
valuable life. We do not even know to which generation we belong. 10 11So we can say 
that we do not perform any unique wisdom based on a complex conviction about 
our existence. We only have access to some knowledge about political affairs and 
the principles of economic theory. We know the basis of social organization and 
some rules of human psychology. This gives us some image of a human being’s 
place in the world, though it remains pretty shallow. 11 What makes justice as fairness 
stable is the fact that, as Rawls maintains, it is true. 
1. 2.  We can also find the idea of the original position in Political... The idea that 
justice as fairness is not derived from complex conviction is also present in Politi­
cal... This kind of complex conviction is now called a “comprehensive doctrine” 
which can be religious, philosophical or moral. But the source of principles of jus­
tice identification is different in Political.... In A Theory..., the principles are identi­
fied through our consciousness of true psychological rules and basic knowledge 
about the world. In Political... this incontestable conviction is no longer an issue. 
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According to the present viewpoint, Rawls admits that the choice of the two princi­
ples of justice depends on the political culture of contemporary democratic society. 
In this society some universal and intuitive ideas are common. Therefore principles 
of justice are worked out by individuals who share these common intuitive ideas. 
Despite the fact that Rawls does not deny, in A Theory..., that intuition takes a part 
in principles of justice identification, he tries to replace it with rationality. The prior­
ity of rationality is supposed to guarantee the truthfulness and stability of the princi­
ples.12
12 Ibid., p. 40-46.
13 Rawls J., “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical”. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Summer no. 14, 1985, p. 229-230.
11 Rawls J., Political..., p. 89-107.
The first sign of verification of Rawls’s position can be seen in Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical, published in 1985, where he says:
“Thus the aim of justice as fairness, as political conception is practical, and not metaphysi­
cal or epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, 
but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citi­
zens view as free and equal.”13
He has maintained his new position in following publications and eventually 
confirmed it in Political..., where he says that in the process of the identification of 
the two principles of justice an extraordinary role is played by intuitively recognized 
ideas: a) that society should be a fair system of cooperation; and b) that people are 
free and equal. The rationalism of Political... differs from the version presented in 
A Theory.... Now it becomes political constructivism, subtly differentiated from ra­
tional intuitionism and Kant’s moral constructivism.14 The principles of justices are 
worked out as a form of practical agreement. Practicality of the way the contract is 
worked out replaces the property of “truthfulness" of justice as fairness. This is what 
is supposed to guarantee the stability of the principles of justice as fairness in Politi­
cal...
1.3. In Political... Rawls envisions the original position as an instrument of rep­
resentation. Individuals trying to work out principles of justice are not, as in A The­
ory..., metaphysical creatures generally conceived, but are representatives of citizens 
of the democratic regime who try to set democratic rules. This is an unusually sig­
nificant modification. This operation caused some other important changes.
First of all, the veil of ignorance had to be pulled up a little bit. In accordance 
with new interpretation, individuals in the original position gain access to a very 
important piece of information. Namely, they know they are citizens of a regime of 
democratic political culture.
Second, they know which generation they belonged to. They are also aware of 
its democratic background.
2. The Self in the Context of Comprehensive Doctrines
2.1. Modifications, presented above, let Rawls reconfigure his vision of the self.
Individuals in the original position are not, as in A Theory..., rational when they 
make an agreement on the principles of justice, but they are rational and reasonable 
as well. A property of reasonableness which is possessed by individuals in the origi­
68 HISTORY AND POLITICS
nal position is the aftermath of emphasizing in Political... an important difference 
between the idea of justice as fairness and any comprehensive religious, philosophi­
cal, or moral doctrines. The category of comprehensive doctrines is one of the fun­
damental terms of Political... Rawls uses this category to describe any complex set of 
moral or religious values and moral aspects of human life which are formulated by 
both theoretical and practical reason - using the dichotomy of Kant - and which are 
relatively stable in time.11
15 Ibid., p. 58-66.
16Rawls divides these goods into two categories: the social primary goods - being at the 
disposal of social institutions which distribute them - liberty and opportunity, income and 
wealth, and the base of self-respect; and the natural primary goods, not under control of the 
social structure but whose possession can be, to some extent, influenced by it - health and 
vigor, intelligence and imagination, good-looks, natural talents etc. It is clear that only social 
primary goods can be distributed by the social structure. A Theory...., p. 62.
17 A Theory..., p. 142-150.
18 Political..., p. 48-54.
The property of rationality demands that individuals, picking out principles of 
justice in the original position, tend to favor, as much as possible, their own interest. 
They try to get as wide an access to primary goods as possible.15 6 This access will 
help them realize their ambitions and life plans, and help them promote their own 
conception of good. Individuals are not interested in the benefits or losses of other 
contract participants.17
The property of reasonableness demands in turn that contractors, proposing their 
own conceptions of justice, be ready to accept others’ proposals only if they will be 
assured of the same behavior from others - that they will subordinate themselves to 
and abide by set principles. All participants contend that they are able to consider 
reasonably both their own and others’ proposals. People acting reasonably possess a 
unique sense of morality differentiating them from the merely rational. The reason­
able sense of justice allows us to rid ourselves of our selfish interests and propose 
rules which can serve our needs as well as others’. In this way what is reasonable 
becomes public, while what is only rational remains private.
To present individuals in the original position as reasonable allows Rawls to re­
construct his conception of the self. In the modified version the self is not only ra­
tional, but also able to reasonably reconsider its conduct for others’ well-being.18
The requirement of this ability becomes natural if it is clear that individuals in the 
original position are supposed to represent not only themselves but also others.
2.2. At this moment it is helpful to present the differences between previous and 
current understanding of justice as fairness in the perspective of the theory of rea­
sonable comprehensive doctrines.
A connection between the Rawlsian conception of the self as rational and rea­
sonable, and comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines is evident 
in Political... These comprehensive doctrines must be reasonable as well. Reason­
able individuals are devoted to reasonable doctrines. Reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines appreciate an existence of other reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The 
dialogue between them, just like between rational and reasonable individuals, is 
based on the exchange of reasonable arguments and on the conviction that the 
agreement will be abided by everybody in spite of their original devotion to previ­
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ous beliefs and convictions (their reasonable comprehensive doctrines). The agree­
ment should be treated as a political conception of justice in a well-ordered soci­
ety.'9
21 Pogge T., Realizing Rawls, Ithaca New York 1989, p. 88. Pogge uses here the Sandelian
interpretation of A Theory..., trying to prove that Sandel misunderstood the deontological 
background of Rawls's theory.
23 A Theory..., p. 397.
23 Ibid., p.' 174.
In the case of A Theory... we do not encounter the category of reasonable com­
prehensive doctrine as differentiated from unreasonable. Complex conceptions of 
the good, systems of values, and life-aims are not considered in terms of reason­
ableness. These conceptions are perceived rather in the perspective of negative 
freedom (visions of good, values, and life-aims of the self should not violate the 
rights of others), than in the perspective of positive freedom, understood here as an 
attempt to work out rational and reasonable principles of justice as a common good. 
Thanks to this common good our personal good becomes available as well. One can 
observe the problem of putting emphasis on negative - (in the case of A Theory...') 
and positive freedom (in the case of Political..?).
5. Justice and the Good
3-1. A Theory... is evidently deontological. Justice is envisioned here as the first 
virtue and feature of all social institutions.20 Priority is understood as independence. 
"X is prior to Y if X (or notion of X) is independent of, or derived independently 
from, Y (the notion of Y).(...) such independence obtains if no change in (the notion 
of) Y makes a difference to (the notion of) X, if the latter ca be understood without 
any understanding of former.”21
Meanwhile, in Political... the deontological character of justice as fairness is sof­
tened a little. Priority of justice is still emphasized but Rawls admits that the idea of 
the good, which he called “thin”, is absolutely necessary in understanding the sense 
of justice.22 Thus we can doubt if justice (X) can be understood without the idea of 
good (Y).
Rawls admits this already in A Theory..., when he concludes:
“Summing up these points, we need what I have called the thin theory of the good to ex­
plain the rational preference for primary goods and to explicate the notion of rationality 
underlying the choice of principles in the original position."23 *
But a moment before, he assumes that:
“In contrast with teleological theories, something is good only if it fits into ways of life 
consistent with the principles of right already in hand. But to establish these principles it is 
necessary to rely on some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions about the parties’ 
motives in the original position. Since these assumptions must not jeopardize the prior 
place of the concept of right, the theory of the good is restricted to the bare essentials.”2'
19
20
Ibid., p. 58-66. 
A Theory..., p. 3.
22 The thin theory of good is introduced to help us to identify primary goods in the origi­
nal position, behind the veil of ignorance.
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However it seems that “restriction to the bare essentials” is not enough. The im­
portance of the thin theory of good for understanding the priority of justice, makes 
Rawls pay sufficient attention to it in Political...-.
“...since the right and good are complementary: no conception of justice can draw entirely 
upon one or other, but must combine both in a definite way. The priority of right does 
not deny this.”2"1
25 Political..., p. 244.
26 Ibid., lecture I, § 6.
27 Ibid., lecture V, § 5.
Is it still possible to be for the priority of right? It is not so obvious for Michael 
Sandel, for example. Since we take care of the right (justice) as much as of the 
good, we should not insist on the priority of right. If we are talking about the thin 
theory of good we should recall the sense of introducing this category, in order to 
identify fundamental rights and freedoms, income and wealth, and self-respect. All 
of these are goods of fundamental meaning and are as fundamental as the right is.
Rawls’s defense against the charge of the pseudo-deontological character of jus­
tice as fairness is based on the assertion that the thin theory of good cannot, by 
nature, contradict the right. Therefore, an attempt to prove the priority of the thin 
theory of good over the idea of right is just a misunderstanding of A Theory...
3.2. We should pay special attention to the way in which the primary goods are 
identified in Political... They are not, as A Theory... assumes, the primary goods of 
a single and rational person, but the goods which are necessary, as representatives 
believe, to realize any conception of the good life, that is articulated by represented 
people in democratic regime. This identification demands again that we be both 
rational and reasonable. It is consistent with modifications to the original position 
and the self acting within it.
3-3. In this way the idea of good receives the right meaning in Political... This 
operation was necessary to introduce to the theory of justice as fairness a very im­
portant conception of virtue, as the element that stabilizes the well-ordered society.25 6 
A character of political virtues should be perceived as a development of a concep­
tion of a good citizen of the democratic society. These virtues have a pure political 
meaning and do not have to be practiced in private life. We are talking here about 
toleration, mutual trust, and the sense of justice and reason. Governmental support 
for these virtues is not, as Rawls maintains, a kind of paternalism. It is not a sort of 
promotion of any comprehensive “governmental” doctrine.27
4. Justice as Fairness
4.1.The  above deliberations about modifications of the previous meaning of the 
original position, the vision of the self in the context of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, and the good, are a kind of introduction to the analysis of the extent to 
which the concept of justice as fairness has changed. And changes are really signifi­
cant. In A Theory... the two principles of justice are formulated as below:
First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
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Second Principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity?”
In turn, in Political... the first principle is: “Each person has an equal right to a 
fully adequate scheme of equal liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme 
of liberties for all.”29 There is a question of freedom here. “The most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties” is replaced by a “fully adequate scheme of equal 
liberties”. The exchange of “the most extensive” for “fully adequate” seems mean­
ingless on the surface, but it is not. The importance of this change is founded on 
limitation of liberties catalog, guaranteed by the first principle. In A Theory... every­
thing indefinitely called a basic freedom was protected by the first principle. But in 
Political..., we encounter a pretty limited list of freedoms. Among them are: 
“freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of 
association; freedoms specified by liberty and integrity of the person; rights and 
liberties covered by the rule of law."511
28 A Theory..., p. 302.
29 Political..., p. 291.
*’ Ibid, p. 291.
51 Ibid, p. 296.
52 A Theory..., p. 152; and in a similar way on p. 542.
Ralws justifies this move by the will to increase the protection of essential free­
doms which are weakened when the list is open and ambiguous.* 51 Yet it looks like 
the main reason for the list limitation is to ensure the cohesion of the theory pre­
sented in Political... It is clear that the defined freedoms catalog is similar to the 
“liberation” part of social primary goods whose understanding, according to Politi­
cal..., is closely connected to the new version of the original position, conception of 
the self as rational and reasonable, and idea of reasonable comprehensive doctrine.
Nevertheless, this modification did not affect the “priority rule” - the priority of 
the first principle over the second one (the priority of freedom); and priority of part 
b) over part a) of the second principle (the priority of justice over efficiency and 
welfare).
However, in A Theory... this priority depends on social conditions:
“It is only when social conditions do not allow the effective establishment of these rights 
that one can concede their limitation.; and these restrictions can be granted only to the 
extent that they are necessary to prepare the way for a free society. The denial of equal 
liberty can be defended only if it is necessary to raise the level of civilization so that in 
due course these freedoms can be enjoyed.”52
Rawls assumes that parties in the original position know what kind of social con­
ditions will secure the priority of equal freedom. If this is true one may doubt the 
cohesion of his theory (the question of the veil of ignorance). Besides, it is not clear 
if “limitations” apply only to the situation of the original position or to reality as 
well. It seems Rawls implies it is possible to suspend some freedoms in real society, 
when some conditions occur.
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In Political... the priority of freedom is unconditional.15
■11 Often emphasized in lecture VIII of Political...
11 Rawls calls the basic structure of society: the political constitution and principal eco­
nomic and social arrangements - in other words, the legal protection of the freedom of 
thought and liberty of conscience; competitive markets, and private property in the means of 
production; and a monogamous family. A Theory..., p. 7.
15 A Theory..., p. 8 and 143.
16 “The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17, 4, 
1988, p. 254.
17 A Theory..., p. 4.
4.2. Introduced changes concern also the scope of validity and the aim of the 
two principles of justice.
A Theory... does not employ a category of reasonable and comprehensive relig­
ious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. This lack causes a widening of the scope 
of use of justice as fairness. Despite this, principles of justice were supposed to be 
worked out under condition of the original position and to apply to the basic struc­
ture of society,* 11 Rawls assumes some ability to extend the scope, at least partially. 
After some modification, justice as fairness could be used to regulate corporate asso­
ciations and be a part of a law of nations.15
A couple of years later Rawls confirmed a unique relationship between the cate­
gory of reasonable comprehensive doctrine and the scope of the appliance of justice 
as fairness in his article The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, published in 
1988:
"The distinction between a comprehensive doctrine and a political is absent from A The­
ory..., and while I believe nearly all the structure and substantive content of justice as fair­
ness...is unchanged when it is seen as a political conception, the understanding of the 
view as a whole is very significantly shifted.”16
Political... does not aspire to validate the two principles of justice in a wider 
scope. On the contrary, the principles should be used only in the political spectrum, 
understood as the basic structure. In A Theory... the lack of distinction between a 
moral doctrine of justice (general scope) and the political-by-nature conception of 
justice is easy to notice. In Political... Rawls confines the scope to the basic structure 
of the democratic constitutional regime by reshaping the self behind the veil of igno­
rance that now is a representative, aware of the background of democratic political 
culture. Justice as fairness becomes a conception of people envisioned as citizens of 
democracy.
4.3. The aim of the principles of justice is also modified. According to A Theory... 
distribution of fundamental rights, duties and goods is the main purpose of the two 
principles of justice:
“A set of principles is required for choosing among the various social arrangements witch 
determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper 
distributive areas."17
But Political... suggests that the main reason for accepting the two principles of 
justice is the necessity of establishing an overlapping consensus among comprehen­
sive doctrines, presenting different visions of good, value, and virtue. A fair distribu­
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tion of social primary goods and respect for the equal-freedoms-rule should always 
be in the background of this process.
The differences indicated above between the vision of justice as fairness as pre­
sented in A Theory... and Political... are illustrated by the following chart.
Rawlsian Theory of Justice as Fairness
Source. Rafal Prostak
Presented in A Theory of Justice Presented in Political Liberalism
1. The original position
The principles of justice are derived from true 
psychological rights and general knowledge 
about the world. Stability of the two princi­
ples of justice is based on this conviction.
The principles of justice are worked out thanks to 
intuitive ideas immanently existing in political 
democratic culture
The veil of ignorance is completely closed up The veil of ignorance is slightly pulled up.
2. Conception of the self
Individuals are rational Individuals are rational and reasonable
Individuals are self-interest-oriented Individuals care for both their own and others' 
interests.
3. Conception of the good
Deontological character of justice of fairness “Softened'' deontology of justice as fairness 
strengthened by the idea of primary good
The primary goods identified by rational 
individuals
The primary goods identified by rational and 
reasonable individuals
4. Justice as fairness
Freedoms generally conceived in the first 
principle of justice
A limited catalog of liberties guaranteed by the 
first principle of justice
the priority rule depends on social conditions. Unconditional priority of freedom
Potential ability to use the two principles of 
justice in other non-political spheres
Validity of the two principles of justice absolutely 
limited to the political sphere
The purpose: distribution of fundamental 
rights and duties, goods
The purpose completed by the need to overcome 
any conflicts arising among reasonable compre­
hensive doctrines
II. THE COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE AND MODIFICATIONS
OF JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS
As was indicated at the beginning, one can notice some analogies between the 
communitarian critique and the direction in which Rawls decided to modify his vi­
sion of justice. This does not mean that he has agreed with his ideological oppo­
nents and has accepted their position. Actually, his main aim was to rebut any accu­
sations of the anti-social character of justice as fairness.
According to communitarians, Rawlsian philosophy is an emanation of liberal in­
dividualism, diminishing the role of society to create: the common good; the civic 
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virtue; and vision of the human good (as a form of social roles’ fulfillment, indicated 
by a society). Rawls allegedly ignores the meaning of social tradition in establishing 
the self. His theory, as communitarians claim, does not secure social stability becau­
se of its imminent weaknesses which stem from its anti-social character. Liberal de­
ontology excludes any theory of justice built on something other than moral rela­
tivism. This kind of theory cannot, in communitarian understanding, claim a right to 
universality.
Communitarian accusations result, followers of Rawls maintain, from a misunder­
standing of justice as fairness, rather than from its flaws. It is enough to use A The­
ory... to refute these accusations.58 59However, subsequent articles and Political... 
help a lot in accomplishing this.
58 This task was undertaken by Pogge in Realizing Raids, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
New York 1989.
59 Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge University, Cambridge 1982.
1. Michael Sandel as a Critic ofd Theory...
1.1. This article excludes a full presentation of the communtarian critique of libe­
ralism in Rawlsian form. It is limited instead to the achievement of Michael Sandel. 
This choice can be justified in two ways. First, Sandel is one of the precursors of 
communitarianism. Second, he devoted his great work to critiquing of A Theory.. 
The starting point of his communitarian manifesto was the thought of Rawls. Other 
communitarians such as: Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer or 
Amitai Etzioni - come to similar conclusions as Sandel, but they do not use A The­
ory... to the extent that he does. Therefore, I will limit my analysis of the communi­
tarian critique of A Theory... to the author of Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
1.2. The starting point of the Sandelian critique of A Theory... is the conception 
of the “antecedently individuated self’, which allegedly Rawls invokes. To compre­
hend this concept we must employ the idea of the original position, in which con­
tacts among people, the system of social roles, moral rules, and patterns of interac­
tion have a secondary and, because of separation, marginal meaning. The primary 
meaning consists of the conception of justice as fairness. The antecedently individu­
ated self approves the sole conception of justice as the final arbiter of ethical delibe­
rations. Nothing can be good if it contradicts the niles of the two principles of justi­
ce. Liberalism... is thought to prove the falseness of this assumption.
1.3- According to Sandel, the theoretical base of Rawlsian thought creates its 
flaws.
Rawls, presenting his contractarian vision of society, does not abide by the rules 
of logical thinking, which makes his theory lack cohesion. Sandel cannot accept that 
the primary and only vision of the self interacting in the original position is this one 
contained in the two principles of justice. The conviction that we are separated indi­
viduals who voluntarily interact for mutual advantage, in no way establishing our 
identity, is untrue. Sandel maintains that Rawls does not understand the meaning of 
the dealing with others for our self-development.
However, Sandel does not neglect the meaning of justice for individual and so­
cial activity, but he does not at the same time accept Rawls’s idea, illogical to him, 
that individuals in the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, are experi­
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enced enough to work out a common vision of justice. An assumption of separation 
of the self from its aims, interests, and obligations which determine not only behav­
ior but also identity, makes human rationality too limited to manage this challenge.
This “disembodied self’ does not posses enough knowledge, which can only be 
attained only by acting in a community, to be able to declare what is just and what 
is unjust.
The separation of the self and its endowments introduces the problem of the 
subject and the object of property. The subject of property is the self and the object 
is any voluntarily acquired, or by the lot assigned, endowments. Sandel perceives 
one of the crucial flaws of Ralws’s theory in this separation. This makes the self lack 
the feeling of individual connection with its endowments. Their analysis makes it 
possible to answer the question of “what the self possesses"; excluding the ability to 
answer the question, “who is it?”. By the same token, this separation rules out the 
pluralism of individuals in the original position. There are socially determined en­
dowments that generate the existence of different objects. This fact is ignored by 
Ralws in A Theory... Therefore, as Sandel says, Rawls cannot maintain that the parties 
of the contract are situated differently. Their position is just the same. Consequently, 
there is no reason to talk about any social contract, since it assumes discussion, 
bargaining, and rejecting unwanted visions of justice presented by variously moti­
vated individuals. Sandel contends, if in the original position any selection does not 
take place, we should rather talk about discovering principles of justice than about 
choosing them. If it is true the two principles of justice have to be determined. Thus 
we have to accept in turn that they are socially determined:
“As agents of construction we do not really construct and as agents of choice we do not 
really choose. What goes on behind the veil of ignorance is not a contract or an agree­
ment but if anything a kind of discovery; and what goes on in ‘purely preferential choice’ 
is less a choosing of ends than a matching pre-existing desires, undifferentiated as to 
worth, with the best available means of satisfying them.”'10 *
1,1 Sandel M., Justice and the Good in Liberalism and its Critics, Oxford: Blackwell Pub­
lishing 1984, p. 170-171.
Nozick R., Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell 1974.
12 Kant I., Uzasadnienie metafizyki moralności, Warszawa 1984, p. 62.
This controversial conception of endowments elucidates another logical flaw of 
A Theory... This time the critique is focused directly on the two principles of justice. 
Namely, on the difference principle - part (a) of the second principle. According to 
Sandel and Robert Nozick,11 who nota bene derives his convictions from liberal po­
sitions, this principle puts Rawls into conflict with the Kantian rule - to treat indi­
viduals always as an end and never only as a means: “Act so that you treat human­
ity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end never as 
a means only.”'12
The difference principle is supposed to be justified by an assumption that from 
a moral point of view nobody deserves his abilities and skills; they are arbitrary from 
a moral point of view. Therefore, we are not entitled to all of the benefits of their 
uses, whatever they turn out to be. Profits belong to the community what confirms 
the legality of the distributive policy assumed in the difference principle. This con­
clusion indeed arouses some controversies in the logical cohesion of Rawls’s theory:
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“But the difference principle requires more. It begins with the thought, congenial to 
the deontological view, that the assets I have are only accidentally mine. But it ends by 
assuming that these assets are therefore common assets and that society has a prior claim 
on the fruits of their exercise. This either disempowers the deontological self or denies its 
independence”1'
43 Sandel M., op.cit., p. 171.
44 Mullhall S. and Swift A., Liberals and Communitarians, Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell 
Publishing 1992, p. 62.
45 Kukathas Ch. and Pettit Ph., Rawls: A Theory of Justice and Its Critics, Cambridge: Stan­
ford U.P. 1990, p. 104.
46 Sandel M., op.cit., p. 171.
Rawls defends himself by maintaining that he does not subject one’s end to oth­
ers but only ltis/her endowments:
“More specifically, a principle of distribution that regards those talents as a common 
assets and redistributes their fruits to others cannot be said to violate the self by treating it 
as a means to social ends; for it is not persons but theirs attributes that are being so 
used."41
However, this operation does not, in Sandel’s opinion, make Rawls immune to 
his charge. Since we admit that our endowments are owned by a community, and 
delegated only to individuals, whether arbitrary or not, we must also admit that there 
is something like common possession. This outcome allows us, as Sandel contends, 
to resolve the theoretical conflict between the self and its community, favoring the 
later. And this is one of the fundamental contentions of communitarianism:
“What Sandel is attacking is Rawls’s (and liberalism’s) fundamental contention that a 
community is the product of association by independent individuals, and that the worth of 
that community is to be estimated by the justice of the terms upon which those individuals 
associate. Sandel, like all communitarians, wants to maintain that it makes no sense to 
think of a community in this way because the very existence of individuals capable of 
agreeing to form association, or assenting to terms of agreement, presupposes the existence 
of a community."4'
1.4. Hence the main objective for Sandel was to show the logical contradiction of 
Rawls’s thought. He claims that Rawls presents two different vision of the self in 
order to enforce his theory. But this makes Rawls’s achievement incoherent:
“Either way, the difference principle contradicts the liberating aspiration of the 
deontological project. We cannot be persons for whom justice is primary and also be per­
sons for whom the difference principle is a principle of justice.”43 456
The validity of the two principles of justice must be biased on the conception of 
a common good which is superior to the personal interest of individuals as parties 
of the community.
This is a credo of Sandel being as well as base of communitarianism. Other accu­
sations against Rawls’s liberalism are derived from it. Liberal problems with indi­
vidualism, relativism, social-historical context ignoring, doubtfully stability of liberal 
regime, neglecting of civic virtue and universalism of Rawls’s project are only a de­
velopment of this original accusation that formulation Sandel devoted Liberalism 
and the Limits of Justice.
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2. Political... as an Answer to Critiques
2.1. As was said above, Political... can be treated not only as a development of 
the theory of justice as fairness, but also as an attempt to reject accusations against 
A Theory... by communitarians and Sandel. Attentive analysis of Sandel’s objections 
and a knowledge of Political... confirms this.
2.2. The original accusation against A Theory... is that it was founded on a false
vision of the self which is allegedly detached from any conceptions of the good life, 
sets of values, and ends. According to the new position presented in Political..., this 
contention is not longer challenging. First of all, the truthfulness of this contention is 
not an issue now. More important for Rawls is to base its validity on intuitively rec­
ognized ideas present in a democratic society. Second, the fact that the working out 
of principles of justice takes place in the political culture of a democratic regime lets 
us accept that individuals in the original position are not detached from any con­
ceptions of the good and sets of values. Following intuitively recognized ideas, they 
support democratic values in the political sphere of activity. In Political... one can 
observe a unique process of the selfs grounding within political system. It is neces­
sary to indicate that emphasizing the political (not metaphysical) character of the self 
in the original position immunizes Rawls to accusations of neglecting the meaning of 
community in its “embodiment". The influence of a comprehensive doctrine on the 
non-political set of values, goods, and ends is, according to Rawls, unquestionable. 
Possible autonomy in this sphere of human activity is not disputable here. However, 
the issue here is the autonomy of individuals of any reasonable comprehensive doc­
trines in working out and exercising the two principles of justice in the political 
sphere. Bibi. Jtg*
2.3- The accusation of the destmctive or false deontology of justice as fairness is 
easily refutable here. Political... develops an idea of primary goods unnecessary in 
conceiving the two principles of justice. We should again emphasize here the merely 
political character of Rawls’s modified theory.
2.4. This assertion lets us maintain that there is no contradiction between deon- 
tological character of justice as fairness and the difference principle as a pan of this. 
Sandel’s doubts were founded on a misunderstanding of the deontological character 
of Rawls's theory and his vision of primary goods, in which distribution is regulated 
by the difference principle. To disperse these doubts is one of aims of Political...
2.5. In Political ... Rawls also shows his devotion to the idea of the common 
good and civic virtue, refuting in this way Sandel’s accusation of the anti-social char­
acter of justice as fairness. Universalism also is not a topic of dispute now. Justice as 
fairness is valid only in a society of democratic political culture.
***
After analyzing Sandel’s critical comments on A Theory... one can argue that he 
charges Rawls with one very important accusation. He claims justice as fairness is 
imaginable only as an emanation of the liberal society, understood as liberal in the 
context of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine. A Theory... opts for the autonomy 
of individuals in all spheres of life. It is a sort of liberal perfectionism that cannot be 
neutral, lest it might lack stability. This means that Rawls really contradicts canons of 
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liberal thought or exposes its weaknesses. The idea of a reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine, presented in Political..., is an answer to this questionable conclusion. The 
essence of this conception, as is noticed above, is contained in the acknowledge­
ment of the meaning of communities in the creation of our individuality. This crea­
tion is, however, limited to the non-political sphere in which autonomy is not 
a predominating value. Perfectionism is not an issue here.
To embody the self in Political... does not immunizes justice as fairness to all 
communitarian attacks. A sharp division between “the public” and “the private" re­
sults in: opposing the perfectionism of the former to the imperfectionism of the later; 
and the full autonomy of the self for the former and presumed lack of autonomy for 
the later. This situation permits a kind of schizophrenia. How else can we call the 
state in which somebody who is devoted to an anti-liberal comprehensive doctrine 
is supposed to accept, undoubtedly, liberal public sphere. Rawls’s endeavor to limit 
the scope of comprehensive doctrines to those that are reasonable can be perceived 
by communitarians as simple intellectual subterfuge, which has nothing to do with 
reality.47 A feeling of schizophrenia will occur not only in the case of individuals 
who are devoted to liberalism both in the public and the private spheres. If commu­
nitarians develop this issue, their critique will remain powerful. Maybe the need to 
face it will result in another reinterpretation of justice as fairness.
17 Rawls assumes that reasonable comprehensive doctrines definitely accept conditions of
justice as fairness. On the other hand, unreasonable comprehensive doctrines are not pro­
tected by the law of the “well-ordered society”. (Rawls clarifies this in lecture I, § 6 of Politi­
cal...) Pluralism of comprehensive doctrines is limited to those that are reasonable. Therefore
pluralism becomes reasonable as well. Differences between pluralism as such and its reason­
able form in the context of the reasonable comprehensive doctrine are shown in Political...,
p. 63, lecture IV § 2, and § 4.
In conclusion we should emphasize that in spite of noticeable modifications con­
ceptions of the original position, good, and liberty and the introduction of a catego­
ry of reasonable comprehensive doctrines and the very idea of justice as fairness has 
not changed dramatically. It still remains a vision of justice that for many is the only 
possible solution under conditions of a pluralistic society such as American one. And 
to find the proper solution for this country was Raw'ls’s main objective in writing 
A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism.
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